Some Recent Social Media Posts

(Check back periodically to see what I've added.)

If the choice is between a welfare state and a police state (I despise both), I know which one I would choose.

He who wills the end, wills the means. Serious immigration restriction requires police-state measures.

Simply put, if you want what others have produced, you have to offer them something they want in trade.

Border crossing without government permission is a victimless crime.

Think of all the horrible things that can happen in the absence of a total surveillance state. Is that an argument for the surveillance state?

If you can't see the difference between a Stop sign at an intersection and a Do Not Enter sign at a border, you need an eye doctor.

Libertarians don't bat an eye over law-breakers who violate no rights. But when it's a person without papers -- watch out!

Statists have long tried to scare people into supporting big government. Today even some libertarians do it. It's a topsy-turvy world.

Dear Free Speech Absolutists: I assume it's okay with you if businessmen discuss pricing strategies among themselves. It's fine by me.

What's the point of being the exceptional nation if you can't throw your weight around?

The anti-free-immigrationists know where they want to go and are prepared to pay any price in other people's freedom to get there. The questions are: why do they want to go there, and what aren't they telling us?

Life is inherently risky. In a world of nation-states, do we want a state powerful enough to address all conceivable risks? If so, what else is it likely to be capable of?

When ICE agents burst into restaurant kitchens to round up people without papers, are they trespassers? How about when agents take property by eminent domain to build border fences? Is that trespass and theft? Immigrants don't do that.

Anti-state anti-immigrationists don't hate the state enough.

The essential case for liberty has never been a matter of data. (Sorry, consequentialists.) It's been a matter of moral principle.

If drugs were legalized, more people would use "public" health services. Same if people could ride motorcycles without helmets or ride in cars without seatbelts. Should libertarians oppose those freedoms because people might use tax-funded programs?

The regime intends to rid America of all "undocumented" persons. But a free society would not have *documented* persons. That's how far down we've gone.

Welfare recipients are not aggressors. The aggressors are the tax collectors and the politicians who empower them.

Libertarian border guardians say there's no freedom to move because other people own property. (We never thought of that one!) By the same standard, there's no freedom of speech.

If capitalism is about survival of the fittest, why do capitalists mass produce inexpensive eyeglasses, hearing aids, etc.? Why do they promote the flourishing of the "unfit"?

Libertarian border guardians say there's no freedom to move because other people own property. (We never thought of that one!) By the same standard, there's no freedom of speech.

How great is this: You can get fabulously rich by providing valued goods and services to the masses. Wow!

If you had told people that [see above] a few hundred years ago, you'd have been locked up in a looney bin.

TGIF: The Worst Are Already on Top

After Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem made a fool of herself by defining habeas corpus as "a constitutional right that the president has to be able to remove people from this country," Justin Amash, the libertarian former congressman, posted an apt quotation on X:

Since it is the supreme leader who alone determines the ends, his instruments [staff] must have no moral convictions of their own. They must, above all, be unreservedly committed to the person of the leader; but next to this the most important thing is that they should be completely unprincipled and literally capable of everything. They must have no ideals of their own which they want to realise, no ideas about right or wrong which might interfere with the intentions of the leader.

The quote comes from Nobel laureate F. A. Hayek, one of the most important social scientists of the 20th century. You can find the quote in Chapter 10 of Hayek's invaluable 1943 classic, The Road to Serfdom. Hayek called that chapter “Why the Worst Get on Top.”

That chapter is worth paying close attention to. Let's start by acknowledging the purpose of Hayek's book. During World War II, Hayek, who lived and taught in England, sought to counter an argument made by prominent intellectuals, namely, that if central planning works well in war, it ought to work well in peacetime. Postwar economic planning seemed inevitable.

Hayek dissented. For him, the economic case for socialism had already been demolished by Ludwig von Mises's 1922 book, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. That book had expanded on Mises's stunning 1920 paper, "Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth," which showed that since socialist planners would not have access to market prices—markets after all were to be abolished—they could not rationally plan a great industrial economy that would efficiently serve consumers.

Why couldn't the planners have access to prices? Because information-rich prices can emerge only through market exchanges. Markets must exist not only for consumer goods, but for the means of production, which for socialists was a no-no: that is, labor, land, raw materials, tools, equipment, machines, and buildings. But trade presupposes private property in the means of production, another no-no for the socialists. You cannot trade what you do not own.

In short: no private property = no trade. No trade = no prices. No prices = no rational planning. Market prices (a redundancy) reflect supply and demand; they also permit disparate things to be expressed in a common unit of account, for example, the dollar. This makes cost comparisons possible. If the planners could not engage in economic calculation through money prices, they could not devise the most efficient production strategies for the countless goods that consumers want.

Why does that matter? It matters because resources and labor are scarce. At any time, our large and varied demand exceeds supply. Many methods could be chosen to produce any particular good, but waste is contrary to our interests. We want the most efficient methods used because the fewer the inputs employed, the more outputs for consumers. Without prices, there would be no way to determine which method is most efficient and least wasteful. The planners would be like blind pilots flying in the dark with no instruments. As Mises said, socialism is impossible.

Before pointing to the late Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Venezuela, or North Korea as proof that Mises was wrong, remember that these systems existed in a world of semi-free-market prices. Worldwide socialism would be a nightmare.

In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek's critique of central planning went beyond the calculation problem. He demonstrated that if politicians took central social planning seriously, the people would have to be turned into serfs. Contrary to popular misunderstanding, he did not argue that if a society takes the first step toward the welfare state, serfdom would inevitably follow. As objectionable as it is, the welfare state is not socialism. It does not abolish private property, markets, and money.

One of Hayek's points—these were not predictions because he observed them in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and fascist Italy—was that central planning required the concentration of all power in a few hands, perhaps one set of hands. It cannot be imagined otherwise. (We're not talking about syndicalism, which has its own problems.)

For example, imagine a society that embarks sincerely on democratic socialism. (Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez take heed.) Hayek pointed out that the people and their legislature might agree 100 percent that the economy should be planned. It does not follow, however, that they will agree 100 percent on the contents of the plan. How much steel should be produced next year? How much plastic? How many refrigerators? How many cars? How many smartphones? How many dolls? Etc., etc., etc. Socialism could not repeal scarcity. Making more of X requires making less of Y. Making more producer goods requires making fewer consumer goods now. You have a problem with that? Sue God.

The chance of substantial agreement over the details of The Plan is near zero. Because of the disagreement, the legislature would be locked in endless debate with no prospect of finalizing The Plan. An unfinished plan cannot be implemented. The deadlock would be fertile ground for the emergence of a strongman. That would appeal to the people who favored action over talk. "Give us a plan!" Democratic socialism would be exposed as a chimera.

In our context, see what Donald Trump said when the U.S. Court of International Trade said that only Congress can impose tariffs: "The horrific decision stated I would have to get the approval of Congress for these Tariffs. In other words, hundreds of politicians would sit around D.C. for weeks, and even months, trying to come to a conclusion as to what to charge other Countries that are treating us unfairly.” (Emphasis added.)

Hayek would not be surprised:

We must here return for a moment to the position which precedes the suppression of democratic institutions and the creation of a totalitarian regime. In this stage it is the general demand for quick and determined government action that is the dominating element in the situation, dissatisfaction with the slow and cumbersome course of democratic procedure which makes action for action's sake the goal. It is then the man or the party who seems strong and resolute enough "to get things done" who exercises the greatest appeal.

Hayek noted that the strongman would need loyal, unquestioning lieutenants to faithfully carry out his decrees.

The chance of imposing a totalitarian regime on a whole people depends on the leader first collecting round him a group which is prepared voluntarily to submit to that totalitarian discipline which they are to impose by force upon the rest.

[The preempted socialist legislators] had, without knowing it, set themselves a task which only the ruthless, ready to disregard the barriers of accepted morals, can execute.... [Emphasis added.]

[A] numerous and strong group with fairly homogeneous views is not likely to be
formed by the best but rather by the worst elements of any society. [Emphasis added.]

The man and party best suited to impose the collectivist project will not be friendly to individual liberty or the free, spontaneous social process that liberalism calls for. Indeed, the "old" values would block their path and would have to be eliminated. In other words, a brutal program will be carried out by a brutal leader and brutal officers of the state, cheered on by worshipful followers.

As I've noted, Hayek's subject was totalitarian central planning. But I (among others) submit that similar dangers loom with any big-government interventionist system. The current U.S. regime claims the autocratic authority to do all sorts of things that violate individual liberty. It does not seek congressional authorization, and it damns the courts for obstruction.

The potential for such concentrated power has existed in the U.S. political system for a long time. Congress has repeatedly and illegally delegated broad "emergency" powers to the executive. What makes the current regime different from its predecessors is that it invokes those powers flagrantly, arbitrarily, and often. While it does not seek to impose a comprehensive plan (yet), it nevertheless has substantial plans on a variety of matters, such as international trade, domestic industry, and labor (immigration). That makes Hayek's analysis relevant.

Hayek opened the chapter with Lord Acton's famous aphorism: "All power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely." But Hayek went beyond Acton to suggest that power attracts the corrupt or corruptible.

A key Hayekian point is that to the extent the regime carries out its plan, which will need public support, its attitude toward common-sense morality will be lax, to say the least, if not outright disdainful.

The principle that the end justifies the means is in individualist ethics regarded as the denial of all morals. In collectivist ethics it becomes necessarily the supreme rule; there is literally nothing which the consistent collectivist must not be prepared to do if it serves "the good of the whole", because the "good of the whole" is to him the only criterion of what ought to be done. The raison d'etat, in which collectivist ethics has found its most explicit formulation, knows no other limit than that set by expediency—the suitability of the particular act for the end in view. And what the raison d'etat affirms with respect to the relations between different countries applies equally to the relations between different individuals within the collectivist state. There can be no limit to what its citizen must not be prepared to do, no act which his conscience must prevent him from committing, if it is necessary for an end which the community has set itself or which his superiors order him to achieve.

Who would relish the chance to round up masses of peaceful "illegal" border-crossers without due process and force them onto planes bound for prisons in El Salvador, South Sudan, or Djibouti? The current U.S. regime will reward people who would enjoy that sort of work.

There is thus in the positions of power little to attract those who hold moral beliefs of the kind which in the past have guided the European peoples.... The only tastes which are satisfied are the taste for power as such, the pleasure of being obeyed and of being part of a well-functioning and immensely powerful machine to which everything else must give way.

Yet while there is little that is likely to induce men who are good by our standards to aspire to leading positions in the totalitarian machine, and much to deter them, there will be special opportunities for the ruthless and unscrupulous.... [T]he readiness to do bad things becomes a path to promotion and power. The positions in a totalitarian society in which it is necessary to practice cruelty and intimidation, deliberate deception and spying, are numerous. Neither the Gestapo nor the administration of a concentration camp, neither the Ministry of Propaganda nor the SA or SS (or their Italian or Russian counterparts) are suitable places for the exercise of humanitarian feelings. Yet it is through positions like these that the road to the highest positions in the totalitarian state leads.

It's too late to worry that the worst will get on top. He and they are already there.

 

TGIF: Maestro Trump and Drug Prices

When encountering a public problem, people tend to fall into one of two camps: one camp, the larger one, says, "There oughta be a law." The other one asks, "How has the government created or aggravated the situation?" We know which camp Maestro Trump belongs to.

Take prescription-drug prices. Because Americans pay higher prices on average for prescription drugs under patent (but not for generics) than people in other countries pay, Trump, who used to call price controls "socialist," has ordered the drug companies "to offer American consumers the most-favored-[developed-]nation lowest price." He wants private companies to lower their prices at home and raise them abroad.

Is this a command? Trump's executive order goes on: "should drug manufacturers fail to offer American consumers the most-favored-nation lowest price, my Administration will take additional aggressive action." We know what that means. "If ... significant progress towards most-favored-nation pricing for American patients is not delivered," his order says, "to the extent consistent with law,... the Secretary [of health and human services] shall propose a rulemaking plan to impose most-favored-nation pricing." Got that? Impose.

Why did Trump change his mind about price controls? Because now it fits with his demagogic populist politics of national grievance, which has served him so well. He vows to end "global freeloading" by foreigners who pay less. He believes that Americans subsidize foreigners. But do we? Good economics says otherwise. (We'll get to that.)

The Maestro seems not to realize that price controls have failed for 4,000 years! They bring shortages, reduce innovation, and cause other distortions, which the government then tries to fix by expanding its restrictions. Never mind that the government makes drugs more expensive than they would be in an unhampered market.

Prices will differ from country to country for sensible reasons. Economists call this market segmentation and price discrimination. Some people in certain circumstances are willing and able to pay more than others whose circumstances differ. We see this with airline fares and off-peak movie ticket prices. Americans are richer than other people and can afford to buy things that others couldn't and wouldn't buy at American prices. Sure, everyone prefers all prices to be lower—except his own, of course—but does that mean the government could mandate lower prices without negative consequences for all? No.

Once a modern drug is produced and sold in the rich American market at a price high enough to yield a profit and recoup the stratospheric R&D costs, the drug maker can produce additional quantities at a low marginal cost and profitably expand sales to poorer people abroad at a lower price. This is good for the foreign buyers who otherwise wouldn't have access, but it does not harm Americans: regardless of what others pay, they buy the drug because they think the benefits exceed the cost.

A government decree to make prices more equal would be harmful all around. As economist Alex Tabarrok writes, banning price discrimination "will end up hurting patients in low-income countries while delivering minimal gains to Americans. Worse, by reducing pharmaceutical profits overall, it weakens incentives to develop new drugs. In fact, in the long-run U.S. consumers are better off when poorer countries pay lower prices—just as airline price discrimination makes more routes viable for both economy and first-class passengers." Likewise, if movie theaters couldn't price-discriminate, we'd have fewer theaters and less service from surviving theaters because profitably filling seats at off-peak times would not be an option. When the government restricts profits, it restricts supply and innovation.

That we lack a fully free market today does not substantially change the analysis. We can be confident that government intervention makes medical care artificially expensive by imposing artificial costs, restricting supply, and stimulating demand. A ban on global price discrimination would hardly help improve things. We'd have fewer new drugs. (Watch Alex Tabarrok and Robert Murphy discuss this and related issues.)

This case against Trump's executive order is valid even when we acknowledge that foreign buyers of American drugs are governments that impose price controls. As many have pointed out, importing other countries' price controls makes no sense.

No discussion of drug prices is complete without noting the burdens imposed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the patent system. Bringing a drug to market costs upward of $2 billion, and most never make it. Private competitive testing and certification firms (analogous to Consumer Reports) could replace the FDA and the prescription requirement. With informed consent, people should be free to take medicines that have undergone different degrees of testing. Life is risk. The government can't change that.

Regarding the patent system, while 15-year monopoly pricing to some extent offsets the FDA burden, it should be abolished along with that agency. Because of vigorous competition, Americans pay far less for out-of-patent generic drugs than the rest of the world. Intellectual property is inconsistent with property rights because it prohibits manufacturers from using their own physical property to produce things. Unlike finite physical property, ideas aren't properly ownable: when an idea is communicated to others, the first person still retains it. Its economic value may fall, but no one has a property right in a thing's market value. For those who fear that the end of drug patents would spell the end of innovation, see Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine's Against Intellectual Property, which has a chapter on the international pharmaceutical industry.

Trump's plan to tamper with drug prices will reduce profits to "Big Pharma"—ooh, what a scary term!—impede innovation, and make everyone less healthy in the future. Drugs currently under patent may seem expensive, but as Tabarrok points out, many modern drugs reduce the need for more costly and dangerous surgeries, and most drugs are paid for through insurance policies. (The government also makes insurance artificially expensive through mandated coverage and discriminatory tax treatment.)

Moreover, as Tabarrok says, Americans get new drugs first. So, all things considered, drug prices don't look so bad after all. The moral and economic case for freeing the market is watertight, but that doesn't mean what we have now is worthless and could not become worse with more intervention. 

America's interventionist medical system must be replaced by a free market in medicine. Most of every dollar spent on medical care today is paid for or mandated by the U.S. government. Barack Obama's Affordable Care Act made a flawed system worse. Coercion, which includes medical licensing, hospital certification, and official accreditation of medical schools, should be eliminated because nothing has proved better at delivering goods and services than the competitive profit-and-loss system directed at consumer satisfaction.

TGIF: Individuals, Not America, First

Let's hear no more about America First! It's a fraud, a cover for collectivist nationalism, and a distraction from what matters. (It also looks like camouflage for Trump Family First, but let's take it at face value for now.)

On foreign policy, America First does not exclusively describe the supposed noninterventionist side of the public debate. The openly interventionist side supports meddling because, in its view, that's in "America's interest." That view is wrong and needs to be refuted, as it has been often. But that does not mean the interventionists don't believe it. Doubt their sincerity if you wish. I can't read their minds. The point is this is not a debate between those who want to promote the "national interest" and those who want to promote something else. Rather, it's a debate over what constitutes that interest and whether unilateralism or multilateralism best promotes it.

That's one problem with America First. The deeper problem is the belligerent nationalism of the movement led, but not founded by, Donald Trump. This flows from its anti-individualism. The nation is the irreducible unit, and conflict must happen. See how Trump picks fights with Canada, Mexico, Europe, China, and others with whom we have no reason for conflict. Look at his incoherent, destructive trade policies. For as long as anyone can remember, Trump's shtick has been that America has been "ripped off" and that only he can change this. What's he talking about? Since when is offering desirable goods at affordable prices a rip-off? But seeing trade as it really is would deprive Trump of his cherished trademark grievance politics. Narcissistic demagogues thrive on grievances. They don't gain votes by promising to stop the U.S. government's global bullying of others.

America is an abstraction, which means different things to different people. In one sense, it's a country but not a single organism. It's an association of individuals who have different interests built on their fundamental interest in peace and freedom. Government tampering with freedom always favors some over others. One person's subsidy is another person's burden. Which one represents the real America? Steel tariffs help steel producers (in the short term) but harm steel users, who far outnumber the producers. This is an old story. Does it have to be pointed out?

So, what is America First? It's putty in the hands of a demagogue.

"American interests" are interests as seen by the people who run the government, that is, America's rulers. They are a filter, an interpretation by interested parties. This affords abundant opportunities to pursue narrow and even personal agendas. Rulers need not have any common interest with regular people. They need votes, however, so rulers will strike the required poses, especially in election season.

America First is about power and devotion to the ruler, without whom we cannot prosper. You know the song and dance. When John F. Kennedy said, "Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country," he was properly rebuked by Ayn Rand, Milton Friedman, and other advocates of individual liberty. Rand called Kennedy's program of self-sacrifice "the Fascist New Frontier." They said that Americans should ask neither question. Nationalism is anti-individualism and antithetical to the ideas that motivated many people at the American founding. Trump doesn't openly ask for self-sacrifice, but it's subtly built into his agenda. He requires self-sacrifice while promising to make us rich. Fat chance.

Where is the individual in a vision of national greatness? The individual is a tool, a servant, and even a hostage—but little more. The everyday lives of regular people are expendable because, it is said, something bigger matters more. Greatness is not really for them.

Nationalist intellectuals—MAGA and otherwise—like to say that America is more than a marketplace. No one denies it, but people live a good part of their lives in the market, and its openness or closeness makes a big difference in their lives. As for the other parts of life, what makes the nationalists so sure that people cannot take care of themselves through voluntary association? Community is a good, but it should be a freely chosen community. People need meaning, but for it to be real, they need to make their own meaning. The last place to find it is in the words of a demagogue who believes his word creates truth.

When nationalists say America is more than a market, they mean the nation is more than a free association of individuals cooperating to pursue their own interests. We should reject that view. "Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" is not a collectivist slogan. It's impeccably individualist. Jefferson didn't write "life, liberty, and the pursuit of American greatness." A contemporary of Jefferson's, Abraham Bishop, understood:

A nation which makes greatness its polestar can never be free; beneath national greatness sink individual greatness, honor, wealth and freedom. But though history, experience and reasoning confirm these ideas; yet all-powerful delusion has been able to make the people of every nation lend a helping hand in putting on their own fetters and rivetting their own chains, and in this service delusion always employs men too great to speak the truth, and yet too powerful to be doubted. Their statements are believed—their projects adopted—their ends answered and the deluded subjects of all this artifice are left to passive obedience through life, and to entail a condition of unqualified non-resistance to a ruined posterity.

Here was a prophet.

TGIF: On the Importance of Undesigned Order

Carl Menger, the founder of the Austrian approach to economics, was not the first or last thinker to see similarities between a society and a living organism, suggesting the existence of undesigned, spontaneous order. The names Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith, before Menger, and Herbert Spencer and F. A. Hayek, after Menger, come to mind.

Ferguson wrote in An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), "Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design." (Emphasis added.) 

The result of human action, but not human design. The importance of this idea cannot be overstated. More than a century after Ferguson's book, Menger elaborated this unappreciated phenomenon in his Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences (1883). 

Undesigned order may be the most counterintuitive idea around, but it is crucial to understanding how free societies work. Trump and his gang don't get it. Observe that he thinks he knows when the Federal Reserve should cut interest rates or how national trade statistics should look. The price system, of which interest rates are a part, is generated, not by a central plan, but by the countless daily decisions of buyers, sellers, and abstainers acting according to their articulated, unarticulated, and even inarticulable personal information, know-how, preferences, and purposes. That "data" cannot be recorded in a central and accessible place for use by anyone, bureaucrats included. So attempts at conscious government planning will only muck up the price system, along with everything else. A bull in a china shop is an apt image.

If you don't get this, you don't get freedom. Unfortunately, unplanned order is, as noted, counterintuitive. People construct some order in their lives, so it's natural to think that social order must have been designed by the government. That's a mistake.

But it shouldn't take much thought to overcome this incorrect intuition. After all, to use one of Menger's cases, no one thinks everyday languages were consciously designed. (How's Esperanto doing?) It's only a short leap from language to other spontaneous orders: custom, law, markets, and money. Menger made a lasting contribution to this subject. (See Lawrence H. White's Introduction in the Menger volume.)

Menger wrote (pp. 130ff):

The normal function and development of the unit of an organism are thus conditioned by those of its parts; the latter in turn are conditioned by the connection of the parts to form a higher unit; and finally the normal function and development of each single organ are conditioned by those of the remaining organs. 

We can make an observation similar in many respects in reference to a series of social phenomena in general and human economy in particular. Here, too, in numerous instances, phenomena present themselves to us, the parts of which are helpful in the preservation, the normal functioning, and the development of the unit, even conditioning these.... It is obvious that we have here a certain analogy between the nature and the function of natural organisms on the one hand and social structures on the other.

The same is true with respect to the origin of a series of social phenomena. Natural organisms almost without exception exhibit, when closely observed, a really admirable functionality of all parts with respect to the whole, a functionality which is not, however, the result of human calculation, but of a natural process. Similarly we can observe in numerous social institutions a strikingly apparent functionality with respect to the whole. But with closer consideration they still do not prove to be the result of an intention aimed at this purpose, i.e., the result of an agreement of members of society or of positive legislation. They, too, present themselves to us rather as "natural" products (in a certain sense), as unintended results of historical development.

Menger gave an example, for which he is justly famous:

One needs, e.g., only to think of the phenomenon of money, an institution which to so great a measure serves the welfare of society, and yet in most nations, by far, is by no means the result of an agreement directed at its establishment as a social institution, or of positive legislation, but is the unintended product of historical development. One needs only to think of law, of language, of the origin of markets, the origin of communities and of states, etc.

However, Menger warned that the analogy has limits:

Natural organisms are composed of elements which serve the function of the unit in a thoroughly mechanical way. They are the result of purely causal processes, of the mechanical play of natural forces. The so-called social organisms, on the contrary, simply cannot be viewed and interpreted as the product of purely mechanical force effects. They are, rather, the result of human efforts, the efforts of thinking, feeling, acting human beings. Thus, if we can speak at all of an "organic origin" of social structures, or, more correctly, of a part of these, this can merely refer to one circumstance. This is that some social phenomena are the results of a common will directed toward their establishment (agreement, positive legislation, etc.), while others are the unintended result of human efforts aimed at attaining essentially individual goals (the unintended results of these).... In the second case social phenomena come about as the unintended result of individual human efforts (pursuing individual interests) without a common will directed toward their establishment. [Emphasis added.]

Menger was implying that the rough analogy between society and living organisms can in no way be used to justify ideologies that view society as the body (corpus) of an organism, with the state or strongman as the head. Since a society is distinguished from an organism by its separate conscious, acting, choosing human beings, it follows that freedom is indispensable to the “health” of society, which cannot be conceived apart from the “health” of the individuals who comprise it.

Score another point for Carl Menger.

TGIF: On Value and Freedom

To live is to act. To act is to choose. To choose is to prefer. To prefer is to pursue values—that is, to value. That's logic-guided observation. Ego sum, ergo aestimo: I am, therefore I value. (HT: Aristotle, Ayn Rand, and Ludwig von Mises.)

Next: to think is to act. "[T]hinking itself [is] an action," Ludwig von Mises wrote in Human Action, "proceeding step by step from the less satisfactory state of insufficient cognizance to the more satisfactory state of better insight."

Shortcut: to think is to value. (James Ellias of Inductica calls this the "value axiom.") Like it or not, we're immersed in the world of "ought." To assert a proposition is to imply: "This is true, so you ought to pay heed." That's the case even if your proposition is something like, "'Ought' statements have no cognitive content." Hume and his fellow emotivists were and are wrong.

Aristotle noticed that human action in the pursuit of ends that are not sought for their own sake—but rather are sought as means to further ends—must aim at some ultimate end: the good life, happiness, contentment, call it what you will. Otherwise, you'd have an infinite series of means leading nowhere, which would make no sense. As he put it:

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good.... [W]e call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.... Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else.... Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.

Note the irony: morality is associated with choice and free will. But "[f]or Aristotle, this ultimate end or good is not chosen; it is implicit in every desire and every choice, and all our other ends are to be understood as subordinate to it. The end is, as it were, forced on us; and the task of practical reason is simply to identify it," Roderick T. Long writes in Reason and Value: Aristotle versus Rand. (Emphasis added.) The ultimate end, therefore, is not pre-moral. Since we are fallible, we need practical reason to make sure the means we select are suited to the ultimate end.

This brings us to political theory and the objective case for freedom. Spoiler alert: as acting, thinking, choosing, valuing beings, we need liberty. But each person needs more than liberty for himself. He needs it for everyone else. Why? Because value pursuers need facts, knowledge, and truth (oh that word), and no individual can acquire all the relevant information on his own. 

I'm drawing on Frank Van Dun's 1986 paper "Economics and the Limits of Value-Free Science." Van Dun points out that economics is value-free in the sense that economists' values should not shape how they observe market phenomena. For example, even someone who dislikes markets for moral or aesthetic reasons should be able, in principle, to see that tariffs raise prices and shrink supply. However, no science, including economics—no truth-seeking project—can be value-free in a broader sense: its practitioners must value truth seeking and conduct themselves accordingly.

The bridge from there to politics is the fact that all truth seeking, even the mundane, everyday sort we all engage in, is a social process. This is not to deny individualism. It's a recognition that individuals cannot truth-seek alone. We learn from what others say and do. The self-interested truth seeker needs others to check him, for it is too easy to slip into complacency without realizing it. As Van Dun puts it,

There is no way an individual can break out of the prison of "the evident," no way he can even identify, let alone begin to question, his prejudices, unless he has come to understand that what is evident to him may not be evident to another and that his point of view is not the only one. Science is a dialogical undertaking: it requires that we make public what we think and try to refute what we believe we ought not to accept, and try to prove what we believe we ought to believe — it requires that we give our reasons.

...A dialogue is an argumentative, not a persuasive, not a rhetorical exchange: the aim of participation is to understand others in order to make one oneself understood in order to allow others the opportunity to indicate just why their understanding of one's point of view does or does not appear to them sufficient reason to share it.

John Stuart Mill put it nicely in On Liberty: "He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that."

This suggests a self-interested "ethics of dialogue," which a truth seeker is committed to by his own search for truth. (This is in the spirit of Aristotle; see Roderick Long's paper linked to above.) It is a code, Van Dun writes, "to allow others to question one's most sincere convictions … to refrain from using rewards or punishments—promises or threats—as means for securing the agreement of others; to refuse to argue against one's better judgment; and to insist that others do likewise. But most of all: to respect the dialogical rights of others—their right to speak or not to speak, to listen or not to listen, to use their own judgment."

That we ought to respect these rights, recognized in the practice of science, follows from the fundamental norm that we ought to be reasonable—that one ought to respect rational nature, both in oneself and in others; that one ought to cultivate one's own reason and ought to allow others to do the same. This requirement of respect for the rational autonomy of every participant turns the dialogue into the primary political institution for preventing prejudice from establishing itself as an impregnable barrier against free and independent thought, and so for making science possible.

Fine, the critic might say, but what has this got to do with the rights of people who are not scientists and philosophers? Van Dun anticipates this objection: "[T]he requirement of reasonableness applies across-the-board to every human endeavor. It applies to action no less than speech. Human action always rests upon and involves judgment. Scientific or theoretical knowledge is not essentially or qualitatively different from 'ordinary' or practical knowledge."

He quotes Ludwig von Mises in this regard: Production "is not something physical, material, and external; it is a spiritual and intellectual phenomenon.... Man produces by dint of his reason...: the theories and poems, the cathedrals and the symphonies, the motor-cars and the airplane."

"There is, then," Van Dun adds, "a glaring inconsistency in the views of those who defend 'free speech' and 'the free market of ideas' but attack freedom of action and the free market in goods and services."

Respecting reason entails respecting persons. But respecting persons requires more than respecting their bodies. In pursuit of their projects in a finite world, people need to transform matter into means to their ends, endowing those things with purpose. They cannot pursue projects or respect others' pursuits if they cannot know what objects they may use by right, that is, without permission. "In order to respect others as rational agents we must know the distinction between 'mine' and 'thine,'" Van Dun writes. "…If we are to respect the person we ought to respect what is his, otherwise we would deny him the right to act on his own judgment, and thereby destroy the dialogical relationship."

This upends a common argument against private property, namely, that a land owner aggresses against others by excluding them; thus, it is said, nonaggression implies collective ownership. But this is wrong. The first to mix his labor with an unowned parcel transforms a mere thing into a means to an end. Further, the homesteader aggresses against no one in the process. If someone else interferes, he is the aggressor by withholding respect from the homesteader. This is not a matter of arbitrary definition. It is a fact—for if the first person to transform the parcel has no right to it, how can the second person to come along have a right? (This is not to deny that property law is complicated and that details would be shaped by local custom. But a coercive monopoly government is unqualified for that job. It takes a competitive market to get it right. See David Friedman's The Machinery of Freedom for details.)

The appeal of Van Dun's argument is palpable. It might look like an additional case for freedom, but it seems more like another demonstration that freedom is an objective condition for the life of man qua rational being. (I commend Rand's case read in conjunction with Roderick Long's Reason and Value. By the way, Van Dun's case is not to be confused with dubious "argumentation ethics," which holds that the very act of making an argument logically commits one to the self-ownership rights of one's interlocutor. That's reality-detached rationalism.)

The upshot is that a truth seeker undercuts his own project when he advocates government interference with other truth seekers, aka everyone else. He thereby relinquishes his truth-seeker credentials.

(I first explored Van Dun's paper years ago at the Foundation for Economic Education website.)