TGIF: Immigration vs. Settler Colonialism

The people performing those mind-boggling contortions to justify, on libertarian grounds, state violence against migrants without papers—restrictatarians, I call them—cite a 1994 article by Murray Rothbard (1926-1995) in support of their double-jointed acrobatics. Rothbard was correct about many things, but a position is not correct merely because Rothbard held it. I expect no disagreement over that.

As a general matter, Rothbard's importance to the shaping of the modern libertarian movement needs no documentation. He was accomplished in economics, social theory, and history. In his time, he was known as Mr. Libertarian, the guardian of the plumb line. (He was also my friend and, informally, my teacher.) His words carry much weight for people who love liberty. It's therefore appropriate to show why, in this case, in 1994, Rothbard was stunningly wrong about immigration, or the freedom to move.

Abolish Antitrust!

"That there is inequality of ability or monetary income on the free market should surprise no one. As we have seen above, men are not “equal” in their tastes, interests, abilities, or locations. Resources are not distributed “equally” over the earth.16 This inequality or diversity in abilities and distribution of resources insures inequality of income on the free market. And, since a man’s monetary assets are derived from his and his ancestors’ abilities in serving consumers on the market, it is not surprising that there is inequality of monetary wealth as well.

"The term 'free competition,' then, will prove misleading unless it is interpreted to mean free action, i.e., freedom to compete or not to compete as the individual wills.

"It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that there is nothing particularly reprehensible or destructive of consumer freedom in the establishment of a 'monopoly price' or in a cartel action. A cartel action, if it is a voluntary one, cannot injure freedom of competition and, if it proves profitable, benefits rather than injures the consumers. It is perfectly consonant with a free society, with individual self-sovereignty, and with the earning of money through serving consumers.

As Benjamin R. Tucker brilliantly concluded in dealing with the problem of cartels and competition:

'That the right to cooperate is as unquestionable as the right to compete; the right to compete involves the right to refrain from competition; cooperation is often a method of competition, and competition is always, in the larger view, a method of cooperation ... each is a legitimate, orderly, non-invasive exercise of the individual will under the social law of equal liberty....

'Viewed in the light of these irrefutable propositions, the trust, then, like every other industrial combination endeavoring to do collectively nothing but what each member of the combination might fully endeavor to do individually, is, per se, an unimpeachable institution. To assail or control or deny this form of cooperation on the ground that it is itself a denial of competition is an absurdity. It is an absurdity, because it proves too much. The trust is a denial of competition in no other sense than that in which competition itself is a denial of competition. (Italics ours.) The trust denies competition only by producing and selling more cheaply than those outside of the trust can produce and sell; but in that sense every successful individual competitor also denies competition.... The fact is that there is one denial of competition which is the right of all, and that there is another denial of competition which is the right of none. All of us, whether out of a trust or in it, have a right to deny competition by competing, but none of us, whether in a trust or out of it, have a right to deny competition by arbitrary decree, by interference with voluntary effort, by forcible suppression of initiative.'

"This is not to say, of course, that joint co-operation or combination is necessarily 'better than' competition among firms. We simply conclude that the relative extent of areas within or between firms on the free market will be precisely that proportion most conducive to the well-being of consumers and producers alike. This is the same as our previous conclusion that the size of a firm will tend to be established at the level most serviceable to the consumers."

—Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State

The Vulnerable Capitalist

"Popular literature attributes enormous 'power' to the capitalist and considers his owning a mass of capital goods as of enormous significance, giving him a great advantage over other people in the economy. We see, however, that this is far from the case; indeed, the opposite may well be true. For the capitalist has already saved from possible consumption and hired the services of factors to produce his capital goods. The owners of these factors have the money already for which they otherwise would have had to save and wait (and bear uncertainty), while the capitalist has only a mass of capital goods, a mass that will prove worthless to him unless it can be further worked on and the product sold to the consumers....

"[C]apital goods are not independently productive. They are the imputable creatures of land and labor (and time). Therefore, capital goods generate no interest income. We have seen above, in keeping with this analysis, that no income accrues to the owners of capital goods as such."

--Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, Chap. 5, secs. 6 & 7, 1962

Anyone Can Be a Capitalist, part 2

"It might be argued that only the 'rich' can afford to be capitalists, i.e., those who have a greater amount of money stock. This argument has superficial plausibility, since ... for any given individual and a given time-preference schedule, a greater money stock will lead to a greater supply of savings, and a lesser money stock to a lesser supply of savings.... We cannot, however, assume that a man with (post-income) assets of 10,000 ounces of gold will necessarily save more than a man with 100 ounces of gold. We cannot compare time preferences interpersonally, any more than we can formulate interpersonal laws for any other type of utilities. What we can assert as an economic law for one person we cannot assert in comparing two or more persons. Each person has his own time-preference schedule, apart from the specific size of his monetary stock. Each person’s time-preference schedule, as with any other element in his value scale, is entirely of his own making. All of us have heard of the proverbially thrifty French peasant, compared with the rich playboy who is always running into debt. The common-sense observation that it is generally the rich who save more may be an interesting historical judgment, but it furnishes us with no scientific economic law whatever, and the purpose of economic science is to furnish us with such laws. As long as a person has any money at all, and he must have some money if he participates in the market society to any extent, he can be a capitalist.

—Murray Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State

TGIF: Supply Precedes Demand

"Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production." —Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776

"In the market economy the consumers are supreme. Their buying and their abstention from buying ultimately determine what the entrepreneurs produce and in what quantity and quality." —Ludwig von Mises, Planned Chaos, 1947

If the ultimate purpose of economic activity is consumer welfare, you might think that government measures to increase consumption ought to be taken seriously. But that would be hasty. Even though many smart people, even economists, do so, there's a simple reason it's mistaken: consumption cannot precede production, and increased consumption cannot precede increased production. That would seem to be logically unexceptionable. You cannot eat what is not on your plate. Consumption is the purpose of but not the stimulus to production.

An ever-present and permanent necessity of life, consumption does not make production possible; it does not improve production over current conditions. What does? Deferred consumption—that is, saving.

Robinson Crusoe wanted to consume the moment he landed on that naturally stingy island. However, his desire to consume did not create consumer goods, and he could not consume what was unavailable. His unaided labor allowed a low, literally hand-to-mouth, perhaps subsistent level of production and consumption, but greater consumption required savings, which required the diversion of time, energy, and resources from consumption to production. Consuming less in the present, he accumulated fish, berries, or coconuts so he could consume them later on while he was making, say, a fishing net, which would deliver more fish than his bare hands could deliver.

This all makes perfect sense once the point is examined, but many important people don't get it. That's why American presidential administrations have pushed "stimulus" bills—massive government spending ostensibly to goose the economy and create prosperity. The government is widely seen as the spender of last resort. (Government spending is consumption not production because it is not the outcome of the market process but rather the reflection of the preferences of politicians spending other people's money without their consent.)

Market-guided economic growth—higher living standards for all—requires increased investment aimed at better buildings, machines, tools, production and management methods, research and development, etc. Investment is the complement of saving. Even simply maintaining the capital structure as it is requires savings. When people live below their means—save—they directly or indirectly put their surplus income to work. This can happen in many time-consuming ways, the details of which we need not discuss here. (A good portion of Mises's Human Action and Murray Rothbard's Man, Economy, and State is devoted to explaining this process.) 

When people save, they of course do not renounce all consumption for all time. They save because they want to consume even more in the future than they could consume in the present. The returns on saving and investment (entrepreneurial profit, interest, dividends, capital gains, etc.) make that possible.

In contrast, when the government tries to stimulate economic growth by directly increasing consumption, it defies logic or attempts to. (So what else is new?) Where does the government get the money it then spends or hands out? I can think of three typical ways: 1) it can tax people; 2) it can borrow money from willing lenders; and 3) it can create money through its central bank, the Federal Reserve. (Nos. 2 and 3 are linked when the Fed buys, or monetizes, government bonds from the original lenders. A fourth revenue option, selling government-"owned" land and buildings, raises a question: by what right do politicians sell assets their predecessors acquired through theft (eminent domain) and interference with private appropriation of unowned land through homesteading?

How can government spending and transfers promote consumer demand? Taxation simply moves money—at the point of a gun—from some people to others. Where's the gain? (In fact, it's a loss because the money might be moved from savers to nonsavers.) If it borrows, the government again transfers money from some to others, promising to tax people in the future to pay off the loan plus interest. So while borrowing appears voluntary, it actually rests on the threat of physical force later on. Finally, if the government creates money through the Federal Reserve, monetary inflation indirectly transfers purchasing power from some to others because some people will get the watered-down, price-increasing fiat currency sooner than others. (Monetary inflation also distorts the structure of production.)

Thus the government's attempt to increase production through increased consumer spending is a losing proposition. People will always want and need to consume. So the government need not manage consumption, just as it need not manage the law of gravity. What it needs to do is keep clear of saving and investing. It can do this by abolishing all taxes on those activities. It's not only good sense, it's a matter of justice because taxing savings and investments constitutes double and triple taxation. That's just not fair. (Not that single taxation is fair, but let that go today.)

Finally, to bring this all home, let's recall one of the great insights of the early classical liberal political economists, Jean-Baptiste Say. Say's Law of Markets, or Say's Law, has been misconstrued in an effort to discredit the free market. Say answered the old saw that economies slump because of underconsumption (or overproduction of everything). Say told his readers that in a money economy, production and consumption were two sides of the same coin. (Pun intended.) People produce goods for the market so they can "buy" money with which to purchase, sooner or later, consumer goods produced by others.

As Mises wrote:

Commodities, says Say, are ultimately paid for not by money, but by other commodities. Money is merely the commonly used medium of exchange; it plays only an intermediary role. What the seller wants ultimately to receive in exchange for the commodities sold is other commodities.

Every commodity produced is therefore a price, as it were, for other commodities produced. The situation of the producer of any commodity is improved by any increase in the production of other commodities.

John Stuart Mill noted:

What supports and employs productive labour, is the capital expended in setting it to work, and not the demand of purchasers for the produce of the labour when completed. Demand for commodities is not demand for labour. The demand for commodities determines in what particular branch of production the labour and capital shall be employed; it determines the direction of the labour; but not the more or less of the labour itself, or of the maintenance or payment of the labour. These depend on the amount of the capital, or other funds directly devoted to the sustenance and remuneration of labour.

Despite this long understanding, many people think that the key to prosperity lies in consumer spending. Much is made of the fact that consumer spending is close to 70 percent of GDP. Google's Gemini AI Overview echoes the popular view that "consumer spending is the largest component of GDP and is a major driver of the economy. It's a key factor in determining whether the US economy is growing or shrinking." (Emphasis added.)

That sort of thinking has led to much mischief. Yet Murray Rothbard wrote in Chapter 6 of Man, Economy, and State:

A common fallacy ... holds that the important category of expenditures in the production system is consumers’ spending. Many writers have gone so far as to relate business prosperity directly to consumers’ spending, and depressions of business to declines in consumers’ spending.... [B]ut it is clear that there is little or no relationship between prosperity and consumers’ spending; indeed almost the reverse is true.

What makes an economy better for everyone is the prospect of a return to producers' time-consuming and risky efforts; this depends on the difference between what capitalists pay upfront—to workers, landowners, and other factor owners—and what they reap later through the sale of partially finished producer and completed consumer goods—if their market forecasts were accurate. "It is not the total quantity of money spent on consumption that is relevant to capitalists’ returns," Rothbard wrote, "but the margins, the spreads, between the product prices and the sum of factor prices at the various stages." (Emphasis in original.)

A prosperous economy for all features long and time-consuming chains of production. And time entails the risk of failure and loss, as well as the prospect of profit. Also, machines, tools, etc. wear out. "[W]ith production divided into stages, it is not true that consumption spending is sufficient to provide for the maintenance of the capital structure." That requires capitalist-entrepreneurs to save and invest persistently rather than consume. Rothbard: "[W]e must realize that there is nothing automatic about this investment. There is no natural law that they must reinvest this amount."

And if they consume instead?

It is evident that the entire market-born production structure would be destroyed..... [C]ivilization advances by virtue of additional capital, which lengthens production processes. Greater quantities of goods are made possible only through the employment of more capital in longer processes. Should capitalists shift from saving-investment to consumption, all these processes would be necessarily abandoned, and the economy would revert to barbarism, with the employment of only the shortest and most primitive production processes. The standard of living, the quantity and variety of goods produced, would fall catastrophically to the primitive level.

As Rothbard sums it up: "There is, in fact, never any need to worry about the maintenance of consumer spending. There must always be consumption." (Emphasis in original.)

(On the misunderstanding of the role of consumer spending, by all means, see John Papola's (of Dad Saves America) two excellent videos here and here.)

TGIF: A Market for Law?

Great part of that order which reigns among mankind is not the effect of government. It has its origin in the principles of society and the natural constitution of man. It existed prior to government, and would exist if the formality of government was abolished.

--Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, 1792

Sometimes an idea that at first sounds nuts isn't really nuts at all. Case in point: the market-anarchist principle that people should be free to buy the law and protection they want in the market.

Even a subscriber to Murray Rothbard's anarcho-capitalism might raise an eyebrow because Rothbard formulated a libertarian law code that he expected would be carried out in a market-anarchist society. In contrast, the market-for-law market anarchist doesn't see things that way. How would a single code even be implemented? It's not as if libertarians agree on everything. Think of intellectual property, abortion, defamation, and more.

David Friedman, a veteran anarcho-capitalist, explicitly favors a market in law, not just in police and arbitration (that is, court) services. Here's how Friedman describes it in The Machinery of Freedom (chapter 29; free pdf here):

In such an anarchist society, who would make the laws? On what basis would the private arbitrator decide what acts were criminal and what their punishments should be? The answer is that systems of law would be produced for profit on the open market, just as books and bras are produced today. There could be competition among different brands of law just as there is competition among different brands of cars.

In such a society there might be many courts and even many legal systems. Each pair of rights enforcement agencies agree in advance on which court they will use in case of conflict. Thus the laws under which a particular case is decided are determined implicitly by advance agreement between the agencies whose customers are involved. In principle, there could be a different court and a different set of laws for every pair of agencies. In practice, many agencies would probably find it convenient to patronize the same courts, and many courts might find it convenient to adopt identical, or nearly identical, systems of law in order to simplify matters for their customers.

As Friedman sees things, individuals would not directly choose among the competing arbitration firms. They would choose defense firms according to the services offered. Those firms would typically have contracted with others about which arbitration firms they would use if their clients were in a conflict. (Insurance companies already do this.) Customers of course would know about this and would choose defensive firms partly on that basis. The defense firms and arbitrators want to attract customers. These are profit-seekers, remember. Also remember that individuals are customers here, not taxpayers or subjects -- an important distinction.

The incentives to submit to and abide by binding arbitration without state-backing would be strong. A defense firm or a customer known for ignoring adverse rulings would have problems doing business in the future. This is the "discipline of constant dealings," Friedman writes. Its powerful influence cannot be ignored. Even now, it plays out everywhere. It is not mainly due to the state that people generally keep their contracts and even less formal promises. The government did not make eBay or the credit card a success. Rating systems are powerful. What Friedman has in mind is essentially an enlargement of the function of the ubiquitous contract, which creates obligations -- law, really -- for the parties, with binding arbitration by a specified agency in any dispute. (If the government didn't have the power to overturn arbitrators' rulings, this private alternative to courts would be even bigger than it is now.)

Wouldn't the defense firms simply fight when their clients had a conflict? That's what many people expect. But why expect it? Friedman reminds us that violence is costly in many ways, even for the winners. Understandably, it's not the business way of thinking. For one thing, a firm would have to pay its employees a steep hazard premium, raising its costs above those of competitors willing to negotiate.

Is this a perfect arrangement? No, but what other earthy arrangement could be perfect when it consists of fallible people all the way down? (See last week's TGIF, "Limited Government's Bait and Switch.") Governments have hardly been a guarantee of individual liberty. Think about the United States!

It's not impossible that everyone in an area who intends to commit murder or theft will patronize a defense firm that protects rights violators. But how likely is that to succeed? Most people don't plan on murdering or stealing and would buy protection against the few that might. (The streets, etc., would be private, remember.) Even would-be criminals don't want to be killed or stolen from. But what about states that commit murder, even mass murder, and theft, as they often have? What's the recourse?

Further, the objection that defensive firms might get together and become a new state also falls short. If people get used to seeing themselves as customers, they won't want to be turned back into taxpayers and subjects. Ideology matters. Friedman writes in chapter 36:

Anarchist institutions cannot guarantee that protectors will never become rulers, but they decrease the power that protectors have separately or together and they put at the head of rights enforcement agencies men who are less likely than politicians to regard theft as a congenial profession.

Some will object that law and the protection of rights and freedom should not be matters for bargaining. But what's the alternative? Who could seriously deny that all political systems entail bargaining? This is true even of a constitutionally limited government conceived by explicit champions of individual freedom. The Constitutional Convention in 1787 featured bargaining. So did the earlier deliberations over the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation. Even small groups rarely are of one mind. But we're not talking about small groups.

Obviously, bargaining goes on every day: between legislators, between legislators and constituents, and between the legislative and executive branches. It goes on among Supreme Court justices. Political campaigns are a form of bargaining. 

Where there are people and scarce resources, there is disagreement and therefore bargaining. It's the human condition. Better that people negotiate and enter defense contracts they choose than submit to a state monopoly: in politics, unlike the market, bargaining has victims, namely, the mass of people who had no real say. In the market, individuals make the deals that best fit their circumstances.

So a market for law isn't so crazy after all. It sounds great. Remember, market incentives and political incentives are entirely different. In the market, individuals choose knowing that what they choose is what they will get and that the costs and benefits will fall mostly on themselves. So they tend to make reasonably informed decisions.

In the political "market," individuals get one impotent vote each, which means that the candidate (policy set) they "choose" is not necessarily what they will get and that even if they get what they want, each voter knows he will experience only a tiny part of the total benefits and costs. The rest will fall on a large group of other people. Under those circumstances, few people have any incentive to choose in an informed way.

Finally, we may wonder whether the market would tend to produce pro-liberty laws. After all, maybe lots of people will want something else, like alcohol prohibition. Again, we can't have guarantees, no matter the system. But liberty has something in its favor: a pro-freedom asymmetry. Namely, people would probably be willing to pay more to protect their private lives from busybodies than others would be willing to pay to run other people's lives. The prohibitionists would have to foot the whole bill all by themselves. There would be no taxpayers.

Friedman gets the last word (chapter 31): "People who want to control other people’s lives are rarely eager to pay for the privilege; they usually expect to be paid for the services they provide for their victims.... For that reason the laws of an anarcho-capitalist society should be heavily biased toward freedom."

Also see:
John Hasnas, "Toward an Empirical Theory of Natural Rights."

Edward P. Stringham, ed., Anarchy and the Law: The Political Economy of Choice (an anthology that contains a debate on market anarchism's practicality and stability).

TGIF: Social Order through Liberty

Human beings are self-actualizing social animals. We need to cooperate with others to flourish fully and (but?) we also need the freedom to make of ourselves the persons we wish to be; we need autonomy.

Can we do both liberty and social order? The answer is yes, and that is where rights come into play. I'll go with Ayn Rand's definition: "A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man’s freedom of action in a social context." Also, "Rights are conditions of existence required by man’s nature for his proper survival." Although rights theory is fraught with the potential for abuse -- many many counterfeit "rights" have been conjured -- it's difficult to abandon the concept.

Liberty and social order are often seen as in conflict with each other. The conservatives' fondness for the phrase ordered liberty. It is meant to suggest that liberty too easily becomes license and chaos. So we often hear that rights must be balanced against one another or against other considerations (such as state interest), indicating that all people could not possibly exercise their rights at the same time because that would produce intolerable social conflict. Hence the need for external limits.

But thanks to the work of genuine liberals -- that is, libertarians, we have good reason to reject this concern.

One of the great synthesizers of individual and social welfare was one of the most unjustly reviled political thinkers in history: Herbert Spencer. In discussing the human "tendency toward individuation in his 1851 (and first) book, Social Statics, Spencer wrote:

[The person] is self-conscious; that is, he recognizes his own individuality. . . . [W]hat we call the moral law—the law of equal freedom—is the law under which individuation becomes perfect, and that ability to act up to this law is the final endowment of humanity.... The increasing assertion of personal rights is an increasing demand that the external conditions needful to a complete unfolding of the individuality shall be respected. Not only is there now a consciousness of individuality and an intelligence whereby individuality may be preserved, but there is a perception that the sphere of action requisite for due development of the individuality may be claimed, and a correlative desire to claim it. And when the change at present going on is complete—when each possesses an active instinct of freedom, together with an active sympathy—then will all the still existing limitations to individuality, be they governmental restraints or be they the aggressions of men on one another, cease. Then none will be hindered from duly unfolding their natures.

"None will be hindered"? Even with "activity sympathy," how then can "an active instinct of freedom be reconciled with required social harmony? Spencer addresses the paradox:

Yet must this higher individuation be joined with the greatest mutual dependence. Paradoxical though the assertion looks, the progress is at once toward complete separateness and complete union. But the separateness is of a kind consistent with the most complex combinations for fulfilling social wants; and the union is of a kind that does not hinder entire development of each personality. Civilization is evolving a state of things and a kind of character in which two apparently conflicting requirements are reconciled.

It may sound odd, but Spencer anticipated “at once perfect individuation and perfect mutual dependence.” He wrote:

Just that kind of individuality will be acquired which finds in the most highly organized community the fittest sphere for its manifestation, which finds in each social arrangement a condition answering to some faculty in itself, which could not, in fact, expand at all if otherwise circumstanced. The ultimate man will be one whose private requirements coincide with public ones. He will be that manner of man who, in spontaneously fulfilling his own nature, incidentally performs the functions of a social unit, and yet is only enabled so to fulfill his own nature by all others doing the like.

This reminds me of Spinoza's belief that to be fully rational an individual must be surrounded by other rational free, individuals with whom he interacts respectfully through reason, persuasion, contract, and trade, not force.

Spencer, of course, is well known for what in Social Statics he called the law of equal freedom: "Every man has freedom to do all he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man.” This sounds good, and it is. But Murray Rothbard, in his discussion of the impossibility and hence senselessness of egalitarianism (in Power and Market: Government and the Economy), made an important observation about Spencer's law. Rothbard wrote:

This goal [equality of liberty] does not attempt to make every individual’s total condition equal—an absolutely impossible task; instead, it advocates liberty—a condition of absence of coercion over person and property for every man.

Rothbard pointed out that the terms equality before the law and equality of rights "are ambiguous and misleading. The former could be taken to mean equality of slavery as well as liberty and has, in fact, been so narrowed down in recent years as to be." He also wrote that the term equal is problematic in the study of human affairs because it suggests a unit of measure that does not exist. (For libertarianism conceived at equality of authority, see Roderick Long's "Liberty: The Other Equality" and "Equality: The Unknown Ideal.")

Finally, Rothbard wrote:

Spencer’s Law of Equal Freedom is redundant. For if every man has freedom to do all that he wills, it follows from this very premise that no man’s freedom has been infringed or invaded. The whole second clause of the law after “wills” is redundant and unnecessary. Since the formulation of Spencer’s Law, opponents of Spencer have used the qualifying clause to drive holes into the libertarian philosophy. Yet all this time they were hitting at an encumbrance, not at the essence of the law. The concept of “equality” has no rightful place in the “Law of Equal Freedom,” being replaceable by the logical quantifier “every.” The “Law of Equal Freedom” could well be renamed “The Law of Total Freedom.”

Rothbard credits the point to Clara Dixon Davidson, who in 1892 wrote in Benjamin Tucker's magazine, Liberty:

The law of equal freedom, “Every one is free to do whatsoever he wills,” appears to me to be the primary condition to happiness. If I fail to add the remainder of Herbert Spencer’s celebrated law of equal freedom, I shall only risk being misinterpreted by persons who cannot understand that the opening affirmation includes what follows, since, if any one did infringe upon the freedom of another, all would not be equally free. [Emphsis added.]

This leads to the conclusion that all people may be free to exercise their rights simultaneously without jeopardy to life-serving social order. No need for balancing rights exists. If all "ordered liberty" means is liberty that is consistent with social order, then we can rest easy so long as people think soundly about liberty. How surprising is this? After all, the very notion of rights stems from each individual's need to act in the world without conflicting with others. (This insight about rights theory has been called "compossibility" by the Georgist libertarian Hillel Steiner. For an opposing view to the Davidson-Rothbard argument, see this from Matt Zwolinski.)

This does not mean the boundaries between people's zones of freedom are always immediately clear -- far from it. Disagreements (both good faith and malicious) are inevitable. That's why, in addition to liberal customs, free societies will have contracts, formal associations, policing agencies, insurance, mediators, arbiters, and judges. Governance does not require government.

It seems that Benjamin Tucker's magazine motto (borrowed from Pierre-Joseph Proudhon) had it right: "Liberty: Not the Daughter but the Mother of Order."

TGIF: Who's the Aggressor? Who's the Victim

When a libertarian says that the most basic individual right is the right not to be aggressed against, a clever interlocutor may accuse the libertarian of begging the question, of stuffing the rabbit into the hat. The trick, the critic will say, is in the word aggress: libertarians allegedly rig the game by restricting the category of aggression to only the actions they disapprove of, thereby institutionalizing many corrupt activities.

For example, If Jones tells Smith to get off land to which Jones has legal title, is it really clear that Smith is in the wrong and Jones is in the right? The critic will offer a counter-narrative: it's considered Jones's land because the political system arbitrarily defines property rights in a certain way. It might have defined rights differently so that Smith could walk on the land as wishes. So why not see Jones as the aggressor against Smith?

If the libertarian responded that Jones transformed the hitherto unowned parcel by mixing his labor with it, perhaps by clearing and fencing it, the critic might respond that Jones's act constituted aggression because, unlike yesterday and the day before, no one now may step on the land without Jones's permission. Jones, in other words, restricts everyone else's freedom. Who's right and who's wrong would depend on one's point of view.

This case against libertarian property rights implies that land has never been unowned because it has always been owned by humanity in common. Such a position was taken most famously by Henry George. While George did not oppose individuals' use of parcels of land, he said that users ought to have to pay land rent to the community, the true owners. This was George's "single tax." Murray Rothbard rebutted George's case in both its moral and economic dimensions. (See also Rothbard's Power and Market.)

If the point of rights theory is to enable human beings to flourish as they live side by side peacefully and cooperatively in society, then any theory that regards land and other scarce resources as jointly owned by all of humanity is in for problems. The moral is the practical. So imagine the impracticality of determining how a piece of land is to be used if everyone is to have a say in the matter. Yet if human beings are to prosper, decisions about how to use scarce resources are crucial. No one is infallible or has a monopoly of wisdom about the "best" use of resources, but we have the next best thing: the market and its price system. The market provides indispensable signals about ever-changing supplies and consumer preferences. Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek made their marks as great economists by, among other things, showing that market prices are the only things we have to relieve, insofar as possible, our ignorance about how scarce resources can be used best to serve everyone's welfare. Private property and free markets expand rather than contract the public's access to resources.

The critic of libertarianism may listen and nod but continue to insist that we have no objective way to tell who is the aggressor: Smith or Jones. But maybe we do.

Life is not an abstraction. Individual people are beings who live day to day through the pursuit of projects, which usually involve the cooperation of others. Since we are physical beings, that pursuit requires control over things, including land, and therefore noninterference by other people. How could we live and plan long term if our activities could be interfered with and the fruits of our efforts could be appropriated by others? I take for granted that each person is a self-owner because denial of this principle collapses in absurdity. Lincoln wrote that "if slavery isn't wrong, nothing is wrong." Abolitionists called slave owners "man-stealers." If self-ownership isn't right, then nothing is right.

The principle of nonaggression is universal: you may not interfere with me, and I may not interfere with you. Liberty for all means no one is aggressed against. Society should be based on consent and cooperation.

In the story above, if we assume Jones acquired the land justly through homesteading, purchase, or gift, then the land is part of his project, and Smith's trespass constitutes interference with Jones's life. (Of course, trespass can be trivial, and methods of prevention or redress would have to be proportional to the offense. Put bluntly, Jones can't shoot Smith merely for setting foot on his land.)

Yes, in a physical sense, Jones's ownership "interferes" with Smith's freedom, although not his ability to live as a human being (except perhaps in an emergency). But human action is never merely physical. Justice is relevant. The same physical act can be just or unjust depending on the circumstances.

I think this demonstrates that the libertarian case does not pack its conclusions into its definition of aggression. Hard cases of course can arise, but generally we can determine who is the rightful owner and who is wrongfully interfering.

Finally, I have not tried to sort out the case of ownership clouded by historical injustice, namely, theft. What to do about this is a complicated matter, in part because of the variety of cases, on which I claim no particular wisdom. Those who wish to delve into the problem can begin by looking at what Rothbard had to say in The Ethics of Liberty.

TGIF: Rothbardian Thoughts on Strategy

In thinking about libertarian strategy, I find it useful to revisit the framework set out by Murray Rothbard in For a New Liberty (FNL). What counts here is not that Rothbard, a builder of the modern libertarian movement, was the author, but that it is an eloquent statement of a reasonable position on how libertarians should grapple with political reality as they strive for a totally free society.

TGIF: War, Peace, and Murray Rothbard

With wars raging in the Middle East, it seems like a good time to revisit a classic work by Murray Rothbard (1926–1995), the economist, historian, and political philosopher who had a lot to do with the birth and evolution of the modern libertarian movement. His “War, Peace, and the State” is something that all peace advocates — not just self-conscious libertarians — ought to be familiar with.

Read it here.

TGIF: Rothbard's For a New Liberty

In 1973, nine years before he published his magnum opus in political philosophy, The Ethics of Liberty, Murray Rothbard issued a comprehensive popular presentation of the libertarian philosophy in For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, first published by the mainstream publisher Macmillan.

 The full article is here.

TGIF: Rothbard's The Ethics of Liberty: Still Worthy After All These Years

In 1982 Murray Rothbard published his magnum opus in political philosophy, The Ethics of Liberty. It is a tour de force, a remarkable presentation of the moral case for political freedom. What a complement to Man, Economy, and State and Power and Market, Rothbard’s towering contributions to our understanding of free markets!

The first striking feature of Ethics is that the opening five chapters, which comprise part 1, seek to establish the validity of natural law, an approach to moral inquiry based on the distinctive nature, faculties, and tendencies of the human being;

 The full article is here.

Remembering Murray

Apparently I forgot to post a link to last week's TGIF, "Murray Rothbard." Read it here.