Happy Constitution Day

                        The real scoop.

TGIF: Abortion Rights v. Abortion Permissions

Even if you cringe at last week's ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health, it would be wrong to say that the five Supreme Court justices took away women's right to have abortions.

I say this because the Supreme Court, unfortunately, never actually recognized a women's right to terminate a pregnancy. Instead, what the Court did in 1973 in Roe v. Wade (and reaffirmed in 1992 in Planned Parenthood v. Casey) was to grant women permission to have abortions up to a judge-defined moment. (Such court permission-granting is not unique to abortion.)

A permission is obviously not a right; it is the opposite. Individual rights are commonly understood as principles that morally and legally protect activities that individuals by their nature are entitled to engage in free from aggression by others, even the people regarded as government officials. ("I know my rights!") Contractual rights are conditioned on the terms of the contract, but those are not the kind of rights we're talking about here.

Yes, the Roe and Casey opinions used rights language. And in their dissent in Dobbs, Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor write, "Roe held, and Casey reaffirmed, that the Constitution safeguards a woman’s right to decide for herself whether to bear a child."

But we shouldn't be misled by that language because their dissent also states, in defending Roe and Casey, "Respecting a woman as an autonomous being, and granting her full equality, meant giving her substantial choice over this most personal and most consequential of all life decisions." (Emphasis added.) Not full choice -- just "substantial choice." Why not full choice? Because, write the dissenters, "the State had, as Roe had held, an exceptionally significant interest in disallowing abortions in the later phase of a pregnancy." Permission granted; permission revoked.

Specifically, the Roe Court said that women have a constitutionally protected right to privacy with respect to their pregnancies -- but only until the state's "compelling interest in the potentiality of human life" kicks in after the second trimester or (in Casey) when the fetus becomes viable outside the womb. This doesn't sound like a matter of rights, but rather an exercise in the Court's subjective balancing of competing interests. What the Court calls "constitutional rights" sound like something else. This take on the Court's views will please anyone who conscientiously objects to abortion as murder. But it ought to dismay those who believe with equal conviction that women do possess a right to end their pregnancies. The Roe Court misled them.

So what now? Everyone understands that the Court did not outlaw abortion. Instead, it sent the matter, to use conventional political language, to the people and their elected representatives in the several states. Who could object to that?

Well, lots of people could. Those who believe that individuals have a natural right to life, liberty, and property should be concerned about leaving the question of rights to majority rule. Majorities can be and often are wrong: they can call something a right that isn't, and they can deny that something is a right that is.

On top of that, the flaws intrinsic to representative democracy are well documented, starting with the perverse incentives and irresponsibility generated by the fact that a single vote is almost never decisive. (George Bush's remarkably close 2000 victory in Florida had a margin of 537 votes. But no individual voter had more than one vote.) If any voter doubts his electoral impotence, he should compare how he would prepare for an election in these two scenarios: the first in which, as normal, he has only one vote; the second in which he also has only one vote but has been assured by divine intervention that whomever he votes for is guaranteed to win.

Democracy also falls short of the textbook ideal because, in light of the impotence of a single vote, most people have better things to do than invest the time, money, and effort required to properly educate themselves about the consequences of what the candidates say they would do if elected. (That would require studying economics, among other things.)

Moreover, no single voter will incur more than a tiny fraction of the full social cost of his making a bad decision at the polls. (This assumes that candidates, who represent a shopping cart of positions on diverse issues, will even keep their campaign promises.) And we also have the problem that highly motivated and concentrated single-issue interest groups will often prevail over the far larger but unorganized mass of citizens. This is the plague of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. (For an elaboration of these flaws, see Bryan Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Ilya Somin and Jason Brennan have also written books on this subject. See also my "Is 'Free Election' an Oxymoron?" and "The Crazy Arithmetic of Voting.")

I join those who worry about having our rights determined by majority rule in the state legislatures. But what's the alternative? Until a free market in rights protection and conflict resolution is a live option, it seems the only alternative is what we now have: the U.S. Supreme Court.

But shouldn't advocates of liberty be concerned about that too? As many have pointed out, the Court resembles an unelected, life-tenured supreme legislature that allows no easy appeal. We may like the Court when it agrees with us, but what about when it doesn't? Even a court that seems committed to individual rights could have a different notion of rights than you or I have. It might sanction pseudo-rights, such as taxpayer-financed abortion, that conflict with authentic rights. Or it might refuse to sanction an authentic right. What do we do in those cases? Do we need a Supremer Court to correct the Supreme Court? And a Supremerer Court to correct the Supremer Court, ad infinitum?

Libertarians who don't want rights left to state legislatures should beware of the Nirvana fallacy, comparing real-world legislatures to an idealized Supreme Court. State legislatures are fraught with danger, but we won't soon see a Supreme Court full of justices who embrace the rights theory of Ayn Rand, Murray Rothbard, or [insert name of favorite libertarian]. The question, then, is: what is the least-bad alternative in the meantime.

Contrary to what many want to believe, the Constitution does not instruct us in how it is to be interpreted or direct us to someone's -- Madison's? Hamilton's? -- interpretation. But even if it did, an internal or external interpretation would also be subject to interpretation. “Any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support,” Wittgenstein wrote about rule-following.

There could be no correct reading of the Constitution. One might say that a particular reading is more reasonable (here's one perhaps) and another less reasonable, but we have no way to pronounce a reading the correct one. A reading could be clearly wrong, but not clearly right.

It is not as if we could have a computer that could infallibly decide constitutional questions. To qualify, that computer could not be programmed by a human being, or else it would be vulnerable to the criticism above. It's human beings all the way down. (See Roderick Long's "Rule-Following, Praxeology, and Anarchy.")

The alternatives -- courts or state legislatures -- pose a threat to freedom. We can weigh the relative risks, but the threat won't disappear. For example, compared to a national supreme court, legislative decentralization would at least reduce the cost of voting with one's feet, that is, relocating. However, that is not always possible, especially for low-income people, and states can perpetrate what has been called "grassroots tyranny." (See Jacob T. Levy's Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom and my review of that book.)

Bottom line: regardless of institutions, liberty is never secure. Hence, the need for eternal vigilance and persistent efforts to teach people to cherish liberty.

Dissolving the Inkblot: Privacy as Property Right

Foreword: I wrote this article when I worked for the Cato Institute in the early 1990s. I post it here because I think it is relevant to the recent Supreme Court decision on abortion in Dobbs v Jackson and other landmark cases, including those concerning contraception and gay rights. I could write a critique of my own thesis today, but I still think it is worth sharing in light of the raging controversy regarding the constitutional status of privacy. Where I’ve used the word liberal, please imagine I wrote progressive. I prefer to reserve the word liberal for those — in contrast to progressives and conservatives — who embrace all the implications of self-ownership.

No question in jurisprudence is as muddled as that of privacy. Conservatives refuse to recognize a general legal right to privacy. Big‐​government liberals misconstrue the concept and apply it arbitrarily and opportunistically. They would protect a woman’s decision to abort a fetus but not two business competitors who wished to discuss their pricing strategies.

The dominant liberal and conservative approaches to privacy are unsatisfactory because they are essentially unprincipled. Liberals, such as Laurence Tribe, envision a right of privacy radiating from express provisions of the Constitution, but that right is so narrow that it is self‐​subverting. Conservatives, such as Robert Bork, reject that vision of a right to privacy because they believe that the method used to find it will allow judges to invent rights. Conservatives seem to assume that there is no alternative vision. But there is an alternative vision, one that derives privacy rights from a Lockean framework based on each person’s property in his own life, liberty, and estate.

The Liberal‐​Conservative Debate

Privacy and the Constitution

"[B]oth the [']liberals['] and the conservatives misunderstand privacy. The conservatives engage in a narrow and unnatural reading of the Constitution in order to avoid seeing what they do not wish to see, while the [']liberals['] find in the Constitution not penumbras but a Rorschach test that reveals only what they wish to see. In both cases it comes down to an inkblot. Both approaches allow their adherents to disparage most freedoms and exalt the few freedoms allowed by their respective moral and political philosophies."

"Dissolving the Inkblot: Privacy as Property Right,"
Cato Policy Report, Jan-Feb 1993

TGIF: Alito's Challenge to Libertarians

In his recently leaked first draft of an opinion that would reverse the abortion-rights cases Roe v. Wade and Casey v. Planned Parenthood, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito gives Americans a choice between judges who read their personal preferences into the Constitution and judges who recognize only rights that they find "rooted in [our] history and tradition" and deem "essential to our Nation's 'scheme of ordered Liberty.'"

Is that it? Neither choice seems an adequate safeguard for individual freedom.

Whether one likes the result or not, Alito's draft in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization raises important issues apart from abortion. Indeed, he unintendedly draws attention to whether the Constitution can be relied on to protect liberty. Unsurprisingly, Alito is not concerned with rights as a philosophical matter. That's not his job. Rather, he's concerned only with constitutional rights -- liberties that satisfy criteria making them worthy of protection by the government. By that standard, an otherwise perfectly defensible right might not qualify. That would be left to the legislative process. That's the constitutional game. The framers understood this, though some libertarians do not.

The Constitution may seem to clearly endorse a general notion of liberty in the 14th Amendment's due process clause, but does it really? Alito, like other conservatives, thinks not:

Historical inquiries ... are essential whenever we are asked to recognize a new component of the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause because the term “liberty” alone provides little guidance. “Liberty” is a capacious term. As Lincoln once said: “We all declare for Liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing” In a well-known essay, Isaiah Berlin reported that “[h]istorians of ideas” had catalogued more than 200 different senses in which the terms had been used.

In interpreting what is meant by the Fourteenth Amendment’s reference to “liberty,” we must guard against the natural human tendency to confuse what that Amendment protects with our own ardent views about the liberty that Americans should enjoy. That is why the Court has long been “reluctant” to recognize rights that are not mentioned in the Constitution.

So, Alito writes elsewhere in his opinion, "[G]uided by the history and tradition that map the essential components of our Nation's concept of ordered liberty, we must ask what the Fourteenth Amendment means by the term 'liberty' when the issue involves putative rights not named in the Constitution" -- such as a woman's putative right terminate a pregnancy.

Note that Alito uses the term ordered liberty. That's a concept in the case law, apparently first enunciated in 1937, that "sets limits and defines the boundary between competing interests.” Why must the term liberty be so qualified? Because, he writes, “attempts to justify abortion [and other things --SR] through appeals to a broader right to autonomy and to define one's 'concept of existence' prove too much. Those criteria, at a high level of generality, could license fundamental rights to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like. None of these rights has any claim to being deeply rooted in history."

If that counts as "proving too much," libertarians would say let's do it.

Alito hastens to add that other court-protected rights that are not deeply rooted in history -- such as the rights to contraception, interracial marriage, and same-sex marriage -- are not jeopardized by his opinion because abortion is unique. How confident can others be about that?

Putting on his historian's hat, Alito accuses the majority in Roe of misstating history and writes that abortion even at an early stage was never regarded as a right in Anglo-American common or statutory law and was generally illegal throughout the United States. Not everyone agrees with Alito's historical account.

Alito asserts that when justices ignored history, they engaged in "the freewheeling judicial policymaking that characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New York." That was the highly influential 1905 case in which the Court struck down a state law limiting the hours that bakers could work per day and per week because the law violated freedom of contract under the 14th Amendment. Progressives hated the ruling from the start, but some conservatives later came to hate it too because it relied on the concept of substantive due process, by which judges could invent rights that conservatives abhorred. Libertarians also ought to have apprehensions about substantive due process. Such seemingly benign legal notions, including "unenumerated rights," are double-edged swords.

The juridical problem in distinguishing putative rights that are constitutionally protected from those that are not is that no constitution could name more than a few rights. Where does that leave all the rights left out? (We could say there is only one right, namely, the right not to be subjected to aggression, and that anything more specific rights are examples of the principle. But that would incite a never-ending controversy over what constitutes aggression.)

The Ninth Amendment, which says that rights not mentioned were still retained by the people, seemed to be the solution to the problem. That amendment has not played an important role in constitutional law to the frustration of libertarians, but danger lies in that amendment if it were to be taken seriously. The danger is that pseudo-rights could be embraced by Supreme Court justices. Rights theory is like a butterfly. You may lovingly nurture the egg, larva, and pupa, but once the butterfly emerges from the cocoon, it will fly where it likes or be blown about by the wind, logic or no logic. (It's been pointed out that the Bill of Rights has turned out to be a tragic distraction. Instead of the government having the burden of justifying any power it wishes to exercise, the people have had to justify any claimed right by finding supporting text in the Bill of Rights. Maybe we'd have been better off without it.)

It's tempting for each of us to think that our own theory of rights or liberty just happens to be the one that perfectly aligns with the intent of the framers or with the common understanding of the constitutional text in 1789. But how likely is that? The framers didn't agree philosophically on everything and people often understand words and sentences differently among themselves. In other words, originalism isn't a neat solution.

As noted, Alito's alternative to judges who impose their personal views about liberty is judges who stick exclusively to rights deeply rooted in the country's history and tradition. But this is also unsatisfying because it imprisons us in the thinking of long-dead individuals whose understanding of liberty might have been incomplete. Why assume that the framers understood every implication of the nature of freedom? As Thomas Paine wrote in The Rights of Man:

There never did, there never will, and there never can, exist a Parliament, or any description of men, or any generation of men, in any country, possessed of the right or the power of binding and controlling posterity to the "end of time," or of commanding for ever how the world shall be governed, or who shall govern it; and therefore all such clauses, acts or declarations by which the makers of them attempt to do what they have neither the right nor the power to do, nor the power to execute, are in themselves null and void.... It is the living, and not the dead, that are to be accommodated.

It's true that constitutions can be amended and the framers' shortcomings addressed, but that process is always costly and difficult. In the meantime, people suffer from the deprivation of their liberty.

Alito's choice between the alternatives is clear, but the Constitution contains no guide to interpretation. Even if it did, how would that help? Any guide to interpretation would itself be open to interpretation. We'd end up with an infinite series of guides.

So where does that leave us? Apparently with two choices: an un-elected national super-legislature free to invent rights or a federal court guided by an emaciated, tradition-bound notion of liberty and unchained state legislatures free to grant (revocable) "rights" by majority vote. Neither seems ideal, but the ideal seems not to be on the menu today. I recorded my thoughts on perhaps the short-term second-best solution in "Disagreement without Conflict."

(See my book America's Counter-Revolution: The Constitution Revisited.)

TGIF: What Really Protects Liberty?

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, as if we needed another demonstration, that little stands between the government and our liberty. Champions of individual freedom have been properly disturbed by how much power governments at all levels have seized since the pandemic hit in 2020.

To make matters worse, officeholders and public-health officials object when the judicial branch occasionally overturns their power grabs because judges are said to be unqualified to rule on "medical" matters. So, if judges furnish constitutional and other legal grounds against power grabs, we're supposed to ignore them because they in fact are issuing medical opinions for which they are not qualified. That's pretty inventive reasoning, but unfortunately it is in the service of tyranny and serfdom.

Some judges have made good, that is, power-limiting, decisions during the pandemic, though they might well have gone the other way. (See John Hasnas's "The Myth of the Rule of Law.") It's only a slight exaggeration to say the judicial process is a coin toss.

When judges get it right, the devout constitutionalists among us cheer: "The system works!" But what about all the times the rulings went the other way? Where does that leave the constitutionalists? They will say that the problem isn't with the Constitution; it's with the judges. But considering that the Constitution doesn't interpret itself, who were they expecting to interpret it? Robots that have been correctly programmed? Who would do the programming? Even people within the competing schools of constitutional interpretation don't agree on everything.

Since it's people all the way down and the process is internal, not external to society, don't the constitutionalists have a wee problem?

James Madison called the Bill of Rights, which he wrote, a "parchment barrier." But he couldn't have really meant that because parchment is a poor material for making the heavy-duty, barrier liberty requires due to the predatory nature of politicians. The only real barriers in this regard are the people themselves -- people, that is, who refuse to give, carry out, or obey unjust orders. Paraxodically, orders require consent, and that can be withheld. (Think of the scene in Monty Python's Life of Brian in which Brian tells a prison guard that he doesn't have to follow orders and the guard replies, "I like orders.")

Strictly speaking, constitutions and statutes cannot compel unjust conduct or compliance. They are merely words. When governors ordered "non-essential" businesses and schools to shut down and people to stay home in 2020, those politicians didn't point guns at anyone. People obeyed, but I suspect that only a few did so lest they be punished. If someone had disobeyed, armed agents of the state might have been dispatched, but why did they obey orders? No gun was held to their heads. They might have been fired and others put in their place places, but no one would have been subjected to force.

So all these state agents acted to suppress liberty freely. They followed orders. Why? Because they believed it was proper to do so. Most of the public believed it too. So they were unlikely to interfere.

Why do all these people behave as they do? They do it because of their moral-political values, which they've absorbed since childhood. They believe deep down that the state -- which is just a large gang of people -- is mystically endowed with a moral authority that permits them to do things that the rest of us must never do. In other words, the people, who always outnumber their rulers, subjugate themselves. (See Etienne de la Boetie's classic, The Discourse on Voluntary Servitude.)

This means that the real constitution in any society is not necessarily and usually is not the written one. The real constitution is reflected in most people's day-to-day actions, attitudes, and de facto institutions. It may conform to or conflict with the written constitution. As Roderick Long writes, “what matters is a nation’s ‘constitution’ in the original sense of the actual institutions, practices, and incentive structures that are in place.” (See “Market Anarchism as Constitutionalism.”)

The upshot is that if people's values are not consistently pro-liberty, it won't matter in the long run much what the Constitution "says," and if they are pro-liberty, then it won't matter whether there is a written constitution -- or a state for that matter. In this respect, the debate between libertarians over whether the state is either necessary or proper starts to look rather different. Stateless societies would have constitutions too. As Long puts it:

Anarchy thus represents the extension, not the negation, of constitutionalism. Instead of thinking of anarchy as a situation in which government has been squeezed down to nothingness, it might be more helpful – at least for minarchists – to think of anarchy as a situation in which government has been extended to include everybody. This is what Gustave de Molinari, the founder of market anarchism, meant when he wrote, in 1884: “The future thus belongs neither to the absorption of society by the State, as the communists and collectivists suppose, nor to the suppression of the State, as the [non-market] anarchists and nihilists dream, but to the diffusion of the State within society.”...

Anarchy is the completion, not the negation, of the rule of law. 

But didn't Madison give us liberty-protecting checks and balances? Not really. What he actually bequeathed was a simulacrum of what a fully freedom-based system would provide. While he hyped his Constitution as featuring a separation of powers (and a context in which ambition would neutralize ambition), he overlooked the likelihood that the branches and special interests may discover that collusion against the people is more profitable than competition among themselves.

In contrast, as Long points out,

Far from eschewing checks and balances market anarchists take market competition, with its associated incentives, to instantiate a checks-and-balances system, and to do so far more reliably than could a governmental system…. Separation of powers, like federalism and elective democracy, merely simulates market competition, within a fundamentally monopolistic context.

These insights are valid regardless of the content of a given written constitution, although libertarian and conservative constitutionalists' love affair with the U.S. Constitution is curious. As the Anti-federalists pointed out when the Constitution was first proposed, the taxing power, absent from the Articles of Confederation, is virtually unlimited and the necessary-and-proper clause is downright scary. Then there's that power to regulate trade, the commerce clause! It also was absent from the Articles of Confederation. (Not that I would have been satisfied with that document. But the comparison is illuminating.)

I won't mention the executive branch's royal power over military and foreign policy. Its consequences have been too terrifyingly obvious to need elaboration here.

And let's not forget the Constitution's implied powers. I know, I know: the Constitution has no implied powers. The national government may only exercise powers expressly delegated. Right? Sorry. As Madison himself said during the debate over the proposed Tenth Amendment," it was impossible to confine a government to the exercise of express powers; there must necessarily be admitted powers by implication, unless the constitution descended to recount every minutiae." Ouch!

Of course, no article about the Constitution would be complete without quoting Lysander Spooner's irrefutable "The Constitution of No Authority," published in 1870, a time much beloved by constitutionalists:

But whether the Constitution really be one thing, or another, this much is certain—that it has either authorized such a government as we have had, or has been powerless to prevent it. In either case, it is unfit to exist

What's to stop a return of all the restrictions if COVID-19 rears its ugly head or when the next pandemic comes long? Not the Constitution. Constitutions are security blankets, and like all security blankets, they distract from real danger: the unspoken values people hold that are inimical to liberty. Only education and persuasion can instill pro-liberty values.

(Read more about these matters in my book America's Counter-Revolution: The Constitution Revisited.)

Constitution Day, September 17

Celebrate Constitution Day tomorrow by buying and reading America's Counter-Revolution: The Constitution Revisited. Dedicated to the constitutionalists of all parties, the book challenges the assumption that the Constitution was a landmark in the struggle for liberty. Instead, I argue it was the product of a counter-revolution, a setback for the radicalism represented by America’s break with the British empire. Drawing on careful, credible historical scholarship and contemporary political analysis, I suggest that this counter-revolution was the work of conservatives who sought a nation of “power, consequence, and grandeur.” America’s Counter-Revolution makes a persuasive case that the Constitution was a victory not for liberty but for the agendas and interests of a militaristic, aristocratic, privilege-seeking ruling class. 

Get yours today!

Podcast Interview on the Constitution

Aaron Keith Harris and I discussed America's Counter-Revolution: The Constitution Revisited on the LP Mises Caucus podcast, Decentralized Revolution. Listen here. 

New Interview: Spinoza, the Constitution, and Palestine

Happy Constitution Day!

On this Constitution Day, may I modestly suggest the perfect gift for your loved ones?

A Preview to my Book "America's Counter-Revolution"

Happy Constitution Day

Buy it here.

The Logical Flaw in Immigration Law

Apart from the obvious rights violation, I see a serious flaw at the very root of immigration law. Let's begin with an indisputable point: no law passed by Congress and signed by a president applies to people on the far side of a US border. Logically, that must include laws against entering the US. Since the US government has no jurisdiction over people in, say, Mexico, someone who crosses the southern border cannot do so illegally because the law in question did not apply to that person when he or she was crossing. No jurisdiction, no illegal entry. That's just logic.

Well, the immigration-control enthusiast may respond, we can change the law to say that no one can stay in the US without papers signifying permission to do so from the proper authorities. (Leave aside the general question of proper authority.) Now we have a new problem. According to this position, Person A, having been born here, needs no permission, but person B, having been born elsewhere, does need permission and can be expelled without it.

But that's discrimination by the government and thus a violation of equality under the law, a core liberal value (as long there are governments making laws). On what basis is that discrimination perpetrated? On the basis of birthplace -- hardly one that can withstand rational scrutiny. No one is harmed -- in the sense of having his or her rights violated -- merely because someone who was not born here resides in the US without government permission. No harm, no foul. The policy is simply vicious discrimination.

I remind the constitutionalists that their beloved document makes no reference to birthplace in its clauses related to rights. Rights and protections against their violation are said to apply to persons, not citizens. See the Fourth Amendment. All persons, no matter their birthplace, have the same rights.

Therefore, all legislative diktats relevant to immigration control fail the test of reason and should be stricken forthwith. No US law could have been broken by the entry, and on the matter of who can stay here, the government has no good grounds to discriminate between people who were born here and people who were not.

Happy Constitution Day!

It's a good day to read America's Counter-Revolution: The Constitution Revisited.

America's Counter-Revolution Reviewed

Independent historian (and old friend) Joseph R. Stromberg reviewed America's Counter-Revolution: The Constitution Revisited at The American Conservative magazine website. He opens "The Federalists' Revenge" with:

America’s Counter-Revolution, dedicated “To the constitutionalists of all parties,” gives new meaning to the word pithy. In 20 short chapters (most of which were previously columns in the Freeman and elsewhere) Sheldon Richman achieves a remarkable thematic coherence, giving the reader a nice window into American constitutional argument and thus into American history.

Building on Arthur E. Ekirch’s Decline of American Liberalism (1955), Richman concludes that the Federalists gave America a vague constitution having the appearance of limited powers but marred by implied ones: a “living constitution” for conservative nationalists. The Federalists, recall, set imperial greatness above liberty and thought real limits on power “impossible”; so-called Anti-Federalists opposed the rule of self-nominated aristocrats and believed in dispersed power.

Brexit, Scott Horton, and Me

Scott Horton and I discuss Brexit here.

Patriot's Lament

On Saturday, Joshua Bennett interviewed me about America's Counter-Revolution: The Constitution Revisited on his radio program, "Patriot's Lament." Here's the audio.

The Constitution, Tom Woods, and I

I was the guest on The Tom Woods Show podcast yesterday. Our topic: America's Counter-Revolution: The Constitution Revisited.

The Framers' Error

James Madison and the other framers thought cooperation could not be achieved without the state. They also thought that under their Constitution ambition would counteract ambition to limit state abuse. But they didn't foresee that ambitious parties would manage to cooperate, without state direction, in a conspiracy against the public. So the framers' double error is really the same error: cooperation does take place without state compulsion. That being so, we don't need the framers' system in which ambition counteracts ambition.

Jeff Tucker Interviews Me about "America's Counter-Revolution